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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN LIGHT OF BMW OF
NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. GORE:* A CRY FOR
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Christine D 'Ambrosia**
INTRODUCTION
BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore' was decided in the midst
of a heated punitive damages debate. Advocates of tort reform
claim that the American legal system has "run amok with sky-
rocketing awards and a crippled civil justice system."2 Opponents
of reform argue that punitive damages are necessary to deter
egregious corporate misconduct.' On May 2, 1996, President
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998. The author wishes to dedicate this
Comment to her mother, father and sister for their love and encouragement. The
author also extends a heartfelt thank you to Brett H. Klein.
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
2 Beth Rogers, Legal Reform-At the Expense of Federalism? House Bill
956, Common Sense Civil Justice Reform Act and Senate Bill 565 Product
Liability Reform Act, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 513, 513 (1996) (citing STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 4
(1995)). See David R. Levy, Punitive Damages in Light of TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 409, 409 (1994) ("The frequency
and amount of punitive damage awards has skyrocketed in recent years such that
million dollar awards are becoming commonplace with extraordinary verdicts
exceeding $100 million.") (citing Thomas P. Mannion, The Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Cleopatra Haslip,
25 AKRON L. REV. 273, 275 (1991)).
3 Richard Vuernick, Outcry for Reform Fails to Address Legal Realties,
KANSAS CITY Bus. J., June 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10046078. Among
the consumer groups Vuernick refers to in his article who oppose tort reform are
the Consumers Union (publisher of Consumer Reports magazine), the Public
Citizen (founded by Ralph Nader) and the Consumer Federation of America.
These groups have been cited in many newspaper articles for their fervent
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Clinton vetoed the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform
Act of 1996,4 which would have set punitive damage award limits
on product liability actions. Eighteen days later in BMW, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a $2 million punitive damages award for
failure to disclose that an imported automobile had been repainted
before its purchase was grossly excessive and, therefore, violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, as
a result of President Clinton's veto and the Court's decision, there
is no uniform federal system for capping punitive damage awards.
As one critic of the BMW decision stated: "[B]y making the size of
punitive damage awards a constitutional question, the Court
usurped power that belongs to states.",
6
This Comment agrees with President Clinton's veto, because
nationalizing limits on punitive damages implicates federalism, and
argues that the BMW decision did not usurp power from the states.
An examination of cases decided in light of BMW illustrates that
while the Court believes there should be a limit to punitive
damages, the ultimate decision of what that limit is remains with
state reviewing courts and state legislatures. Part I of this Comment
deals with the Supreme Court's treatment of punitive damages
before BMW. Part I reveals that while BMW was the first case in
which the Court dealt with the character of the standard that
identifies unconstitutionally excessive awards, the Court added little
to the punitive damages debate because it used the same analysis
as in the past for reviewing procedural due process challenges of
support of President Clinton's veto of the Common Sense Product Liability
Reform Act. See Martha M. Hamilton, Clinton Threatens to Veto Compromise
Bill Limiting Companies' Product Liability, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1996, at 1,
available in 1996 WL 5830021 (reporting that Clinton's opposition expresses
what consumer groups have been fighting for during the past 15 years); President
Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Bill, LIABILITY WK., May 6, 1996, available in
1996 WL 9457798 (reporting that the Public Citizen applauded President
Clinton's veto).
4 H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); see 142 CONG. REC. D420 (daily
ed. May 3, 1996) (vetoing H.R. 956); 142 CONG. REC. H4764 (daily ed. May 9,
1996) (failing to overrule the veto by a vote of 258-163).
5 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
6 Court is Right, and Wrong, on Punitive Damages, NEWSDAY, May 23,
1996, at A60 [hereinafter Court is Right).
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punitive damage awards. Part II reviews the factual background and
the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in BMW. Part III
addresses the aftermath of BMW by showing that the decision is an
advisory opinion 'of how state courts should evaluate the issue of
punitive damages. Part III also discusses the Court's position on
punitive damages and will examine cases decided in light of BMW
to determine how courts are applying the guideposts articulated by
BMW. Part III reveals that while courts are applying BMW
guideposts on the federal level, state courts are merely paying lip
service to the decision. Lastly, Part IV examines the issues left
open after BMW. This Comment concludes that the BMW decision
strikes a balance between fair notice and state sovereignty and
between tort reform and consumer activism, while preserving the
purpose punitive damages are intended to serve: to prevent and
deter future misconduct.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
BEFORE BMW
Punitive damages have recently been challenged under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,7 the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,8 and the Equal Protec-
tion9 and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."). See
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989)
(holding that the Excessive Fines Clause "does not constrain an award of money
damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action
nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded").
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."). See United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) (noting that under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
a defendant may not sustain a civil penalty after criminal prosecution by the
government which "is not rationally related to the goal of making the govern-
ment whole").
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
'o Id. ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . ."). In Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v.
579
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Despite these challenges and the Supreme Court's concern about
punitive damages that "run wild,"" it is clear that: "the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes some limit
on the amount of punitive damage awards."' 2 Under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, punitive damages
have been challenged on both a substantive and procedural basis.'3
A substantive challenge focuses on the amount of constraint on jury
discretion required by the Due Process Clause 4 and thus requires
limiting grossly excessive punitive damages.'5 A procedural
challenge evaluates the procedures followed that produced the
award to ensure fairness against potential deprivation of life, liberty
or property under the Due Process Clause. 6 Procedural due
process may require a maximum amount or ratio on the amount of
the award.' 7
A review of cases leading up to BMW illustrates that while
cases before BMW have recognized that the U.S. Constitution
imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards,
BMW was the first case that directly concerned itself with a
substantive due process challenge, specifically the character of the
Crenshaw, an insurer asserted that a punitive damages award violated "due
process, equal protection, and other constitutional standards." 486 U.S. 71, 76
(1988). While the Supreme Court did not reach the insurer's excessive punitive
damages claim because it was not raised and passed upon in state court, Justice
O'Connor in a concurrence noted that the "appellant had touched on a due
process issue that ... is worthy of the Court's attention in an appropriate case."
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
2 Raymond B. Landry, Punitive Damages andJury Trials, 43 LA. B.J. 264,
265 (1995) (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443
(1993)).
13 See Levy, supra note 2, at 410.
4 See Levy, supra note 2, at 410 (citing William H. Volz & Michael C.
Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process Clause: The Search for Consti-
tutional Standards, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 459, 470 (1992)).
"5 Benjamin Alliker, Punitive Damage Awards After Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg: Analyzing the Triumvirate of History, Due Process and the Jury, 6 MD.
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 377, 386 (1995).
16 Id. at 385.
17 Levy, supra note 2, at 410.
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standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards.'"
The standards articulated by the BMW court to help trial and
reviewing courts detect a constitutionally excessive award are,
however, the same standards used by the Supreme Court in cases
prior to BMW to detect a procedurally defective award. 9 BMW
only limitation on the actual amount of punitive damage awards is
the requirement that lower courts compare the punitive damages
award to the civil or criminal penalties that may be imposed for
comparable misconduct.2 ° While this is not a novel articulation,2'
it is an interesting one because deferring to legislative judgments
suggests that the judiciary is not the proper branch of government
to determine whether, substantively, the amount of a punitive
damages award is excessive.22
A. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Haslip
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,23 respondent
Haslip was required to pay a hospital bill when the hospital was
'g See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996).
For example, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Supreme
Court held that the Hammond v. Gadsden criteria and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby
factors, used by the trial court and Supreme Court of Alabama to determine
whether a punitive damages award is excessive, "imposes a sufficiently definite
and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding
punitive damages." 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991). BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore's first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
is part of the Hammond criteria. Id. at 18 (citing Hammond v. Gadsden, 493 So.
2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986)). BMW's second and third guidepost, ratio and
sanctions for comparable conduct, are two Hornsby factors. Id. at 21 (citing
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)); see infra note
157 (setting forth the Hornsby factors).
20 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
21 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a
court reviewing a punitive damages award for excessiveness should defer to
legislative judgments for comparable misconduct).
22 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603 (suggesting that excessive punitive damages
determinations be left to state legislatures).
23 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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unable to confirm her health coverage.24 After Haslip defaulted on
the payment, a collection agency obtained a judgment against
Haslip and, as a result, her credit was adversely affected." Haslip,
along with three other city employees who believed they were
covered under a health insurance policy, filed suit in Alabama
naming as defendants Pacific Mutual and its agent, Lemmie L.
Ruffin, Jr., alleging that Ruffin collected premiums but failed to
remit them to the insurers, thus causing plaintiffs' health insurance
policies to lapse without their knowledge. 6 Haslip also sought
damages for fraud. 7
The jury was instructed that it could award punitive damages if
it found the defendant liable for fraud. It was explained to the
jury that punitive damages serve the purposes of punishment and
deterrence of future wrongdoing and the imposition of punitive
damages was discretionary.2 9 However, the only guideline given
to the jury was "to take into consideration the character and the
degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence."3 Pacific
Mutual's financial worth was not introduced into evidence. 3' The
jury consequently returned general verdicts for the plaintiffs,
awarding Haslip $1,040,000.00.32 The Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed by a divided vote and upheld the punitive damages
award.33
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the punitive damages award
in Haslip did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.34 Under the traditional common-law approach for
determining punitive damage awards, the jury assesses the amount
of the award and the trial and appellate courts review the
24 Id. at 5.
25 Id.
26 id.
217 Id. at 6.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 7.
30 Id.
" Id. at 6.
32 Id. at 7 n.2 (awarding Haslip $840,000.00 in punitive damages as part of
the $1,040,000.00 award).
33 Id. at 7.
34 Id. at 19.
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reasonableness of the jury's determination. 35 The Court approved
the common-law approach by reasoning that "every state and
federal court that has considered the question has ruled that the
common-law method for assessing punitive damages does not in
itself violate due process., 36 Thus, the Court reached its conclu-
sion by examining the jury's instructions and the trial court and
Alabama Supreme Court's review.
37
The Court approved the jury instructions because they "reason-
ably accommodated Pacific Mutual's interest in rational decision-
making and Alabama's interest in meaningful individualized
assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution., 38 Further,
the Court noted that the assessment of punitive damages is not the
only area under Alabama law where the jury is allowed unbridled
discretion. Some examples of this discretion include "deciding 'the
best interests of the child,' 'reasonable care,' 'due diligence' or
appropriate compensation for pain and suffering or mental
anguish."39 The Court also seemed to suggest that because
evidence of Pacific Mutual's wealth was excluded at trial, the
jury's finding was more acceptable.4"
The Court noted that the trial court and Supreme Court of
Alabama adequately applied the post-trial procedures for reviewing
an award under Alabama law. 41 The Court condoned the factors
31 Id. at 15.
36 Id. at 17.
37 Id. at 19-23.
38 Id. at 20.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 22. The majority cited Southern Life & Health Insurance Co. v.
Whitman, 358 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Ala. 1978), which held that evidence of the
defendant's wealth is inadmissible because it is highly prejudicial. Id.
Interestingly, later in its opinion the Court stated that "while punitive damages
in Alabama may embrace such factors as the heinousness of the civil wrong, its
effect upon the victim, the likelihood of its recurrence, and the extent of the
defendant's wrongful gain, the factfinder must be guided by more than the
defendant's net worth." Id. Further, the Court noted that Alabama plaintiffs "do
not enjoy a windfall because they have the good fortune to have a defendant with
a deep pocket." Id. at 21. Thus, it is difficult to assess the Court's opinion about
whether a defendant's financial position should be disclosed to the jury.
4 Id. at 23. The Court held that the post-trial procedures for scrutinizing
punitive damage awards established by the Alabama Supreme Court in Hammond
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considered by the Alabama Supreme Court in determining the
reasonableness of the award:
(1) whether the punitive damages are reasonably
related to the harm that is likely to occur
from the defendant's conduct as well as to the
harm that actually has occurred;
(2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defen-
dant's conduct;
(3) the ability to remove any profitability attri-
buted to the defendant's wrongful conduct so
that the defendant suffers a loss;
(4) the financial position of the defendant;
(5) the costs of litigation;
(6) if criminal sanctions have been imposed
which would mitigate the award; and
(7) any other civil action against the same
defendant, based on the same conduct, which
would mitigate the punitive damages
award.42
The first and second factors comprise BMWs first and second
guidepost.4 3
B. TXO Production Corp. v Alliance Resources Corp.
In TXO Production Corp. v Alliance Resources Corp.,4 4
Alliance Resources Corp. ("Alliance") accepted TXO Production
Corp.'s ("TXO") offer to purchase from Alliance a tract of land in
v. Gadsden, were "meaningful and adequate." Id. at 20. See Hammond v.
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986) (listing factors that trial courts
should consider when reviewing punitive damage awards). See also Levy, supra
note 2, at 417 ("[T]he Court merely condoned the Alabama standards for
reviewing an award" and the Court "failed to articulate a standard for assessing
punitive damages .... ").
42 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)). See infra note 157 (discussing the Hornsby factors for
determining unconstitutional punitive damage awards).
43See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-99 (1996).
44 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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Virginia, known as "Blevins Tract," for the purpose of recovering
the gas and oil beneath the land. 45 Alliance agreed to return the
consideration paid to it if Alliance's title failed.46 After the
agreement was signed, TXO discovered a 1958 deed that had
previously conveyed the mineral rights of Blevins Tract.47 This
discovery resulted in two attempts by TXO to fraudulently cloud
the title to the oil and gas rights.4' TXO subsequently attempted
to renegotiate the royalty agreement with Alliance, however this
proved unsuccessful, and TXO brought suit against Alliance for a
declaratory judgment to remove the cloud on title to the oil and gas
development rights.49 Alliance filed a counterclaim for slander of
title.5 °
The trial court found that the vested quitclaim deed "was clear
and unambiguous and that the title to the oil and gas was properly
vested in Alliance." 5' The jury, which tried the counterclaim for
slander, awarded Alliance $19,000.00 in actual damages and $10
million in punitive damages.52 TXO subsequently filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur arguing
that the punitive damages award, which was 526 times greater than
actual damages, violated the Due Process Clause. 3 TXO argued
that the jury was left to its own discretion and that it lacked
guidance to decide a constitutionally acceptable award.54 The trial
court denied these motions and the Supreme Court of Appeals of
41 Id. at 447.
46 Id. at 447-48.
47 Id. at 448.
48 Id. at 449. First, after TXO unsuccessfully tried to convince the current
owner of the mineral rights that it also had an interest in the oil and gas rights,
TXO purchased a quitclaim deed for the owner's interest in Blevins Tract. Id.
Second, TXO unsuccessfully attempted to get a prior conveyee of the mineral
rights "to execute a false affidavit indicating that the 1958 deed might have
included oil and gas rights." Id.
49 Id. at 449.
o Id. at 447.
5' Levy, supra note 2, at 421 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1992)).
52 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 451 (1993).
53 id.
54 Id.
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West Virginia affirmed." The U.S. Supreme Court then granted
certiorari to decide whether the punitive damages award was
excessive or the product of an unfair procedure in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The plurality did not adopt "either the rational basis test offered
by Alliance or the heightened scrutiny test offered by TXO. ' 5
Rather, the TXO court followed Haslip and held that, "[a]ssuming
fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of that
process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity."58 While
"[a] general concern of reasonableness . properly enters into the
constitutional calculus of due process ... [the Court does] not
suggest that a defendant has a substantive due process right to a
correct determination of the 'reasonableness' of a punitive damages
award.5
5 9
After reviewing whether the punitive damages award was
reasonably related to either the actual or potential harm that might
result from TXO's conduct,6" the possible future harm to other
victims if similar behavior was not deterred6 and whether the trial
judge properly reviewed the punitive damages award,62 the Court
concluded that "the award was not so 'grossly excessive' as to be
" Id. at 452.
56 Id. at 446.
57 Levy, supra note 2, at 422. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 456.
58 TXO, 509 U.S. at 457.
'9 Id. at 458 n.24 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
18 (1991)).
6 Id. at 460. The U.S. Supreme Court was aware that in its recent decision
in Haslip, it noted that the award which was four times the amount of compen-
satory damages "'may be close to the line' of constitutional permissibility." Id.
at 459 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)).
Here, the Court explained that a punitive damages award that was over 526 times
greater than actual damages was justified because the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia concluded that TXO's pattern of behavior "could potentially
cause millions of dollars in damages to other victims." Id. at 460-61 (quoting
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va.
1992)). The Court held that "[iut is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the
potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended
victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded ... " Id. at 460.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 464-65.
586
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. GORE
beyond the power of the state to allow."63 Lastly, the Court
approved of the consideration of a defendant's "financial position"
in assessing punitive damages.64
C. Honda Motor Co. v Oberg
In Honda Motor Co. v Oberg,65 the issue was whether an
amendment to the Oregon Constitution violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 Under the amendment to
the state constitution, the amount of a punitive damages award
determined by a jury cannot be judicially reviewed "unless the
court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the
verdict. '67 Thus, the specific issue before the U.S. Supreme Court
was whether the Due Process Clause required judicial review of the
amount of punitive damage awards.68
The lawsuit was initiated when Honda Motor Company
("Honda") manufactured and sold a three-wheeled all-terrain
vehicle that overturned while Oberg was driving it, causing him
severe and permanent injuries.69 Oberg brought suit alleging that
Honda "[k]new or should have known that the vehicle had an
inherently and unreasonably dangerous design."7 The jury found
Honda liable and awarded Oberg $919,390.39 in compensatory
damages and $5 million in punitive damages.7 On appeal, Honda
argued that the award of punitive damages was unconstitutionally
excessive under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Oregon courts lacked
63 Id. at 462.
64 Id. at 462 n.28 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
22 (1991)).
65 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
66 Id. at 2334.
67 Id.
61 Id. at 2335. The Supreme Court added that "in the case before us today,
we are not directly concerned with the character of the standard that will identify
unconstitutionally excessive awards." Id.
69 Id. at 2334.
70 id.
71 Id. The compensatory damages were reduced by 20% to $735,512.31
because Oberg was contributorily negligent. Id.
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power to correct excessive verdicts." Both the Oregon Court of
Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.73
Oregon's highest court rejected Honda's arguments, relying
heavily on the fact that the Oregon statute governing the award of
punitive damages and the numerous factors involved in jury
determination74 ensures that "sufficiently definite and meaningful
constraints are imposed on the finder of fact . . . ." Moreover,
the Oregon Supreme Court noted that Oregon provides an
additional protection by requiring the plaintiff to prove entitlement
to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence rather than
a mere preponderance.76  These safeguards led the Oregon
Supreme Court to conclude that Haslip did not require a court to
72 id.
73 id.
74 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.537, 30.925 (1995). The Oregon statute
provides:
(1) Punitive damages are not recoverable in a civil action unless
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the party
against whom punitive damages are sought has acted with
malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference
to the health, safety and welfare of others.
Id. § 18.537.
Punitive damages may be awarded based on the following factors:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise
from the defendant's misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability of the defendant's misconduct;
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of
the misconduct;
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and
(g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed on the
defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not
limited to, punitive damages awards to persons in situations
similar to the claimant's and the severity of criminal
penalties to which the defendant has been or may be
subjected.
Id. § 30.925.
" Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (Or. 1993), cert.
granted, 510 U.S. 1068, rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
76 Id
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subject an award to post-verdict or appellate review which includes
the possibility of remittitur." The Supreme Court granted cert-
iorari to consider whether "Oregon's limited judicial review of the
size of punitive damages awards is consistent with its decision in
Haslip."7
8
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that there was a "dramatic
difference" between the common-law procedure and the Oregon
procedure. 79 Common-law courts in the United States emphasized
deference to jury verdicts and provided for judicial review of the
size of damage awards .8  However, while an Oregon trial or
appellate court may order a new trial if the jury was not properly
instructed, if error occurred during the trial or if there was no
evidence to support any punitive damages at all, Oregon provided
no procedure for reducing or setting aside the award if the
defendant's only basis for relief was the amount of punitive
damages the jury awarded."1 This led the seven-justice majority to
conclude that Oregon must provide judicial review.82 The Court
reasoned that judicial review is necessary to prevent "arbitrary
deprivation of property '83 and that the punitive damages deter-
mination should not be "committed to the unreviewable discretion
of the jury."84 The Court also recognized the need for a "substan-
tive limit on the size of punitive damage awards.8A5
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the $5 million
punitive damages award.8 6 The court applied the following legal
standard to post-verdict judicial review of a jury's award of
punitive damages:
77 Id.
71 Oberg, 114 S. Ct. at 2334-35.
79 Id. at 2338.
80 Id. at 2336-37.
8" Id. at 2338.
82 Id. at 2339.
83 Id. at 2340.
84 Id. at 2342.
85 Bruce J. Mckee, The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive
Damages Litigation: Observations from a Participant, 48 ALA. L. REV. 175, 180
(1996) (citing Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994)).
6 Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 888 P.2d 8, 10 (Or. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1847 (1996).
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Was the award of punitive damages within the range that
a rational juror would be entitled to award in the light of
the record as a whole? The range that a rational juror is
entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and
common law factors that the jury is instructed and per-
mitted to consider when awarding punitive damages for a
given claim.87
The court concluded that the award of punitive damages in this
case was within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to
award because the plaintiff presented evidence at trial from which
a juror could conclude that the defendants acted with wanton
disregard for the health and safety of others.88 Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion did not operate to limit the punitive
damage award.
II. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. V. GORE
In BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore,89 the U.S. Supreme
Court, for the first time, invalidated a state court's award of
punitive damages as excessive, and therefore in breach of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.90 This section will
review the factual background of BMW, and describe in detail the
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions given in this case.
A. Facts
Nine months after purchasing a black BMW sports sedan for
$40,750.88 from an authorized BMW dealer in Birmingham,
Alabama, respondent Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. took the car to an indepen-
dent dealer to make the car look "snazzier than it normally would
appear."91 After learning from the dealer that the car had been
repainted before Dr. Gore purchased it, Dr. Gore brought suit
against petitioner BMW of North America ("BMW"), the American
17 Id. at 12.
88 Id. at 13.
89 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
90 Id. at 1598.
91 Id
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distributor of BMW automobiles, alleging that the failure to
disclose that the car had been repainted constituted the tort of fraud
because BMW suppressed a material fact.92
At trial, Dr. Gore argued for $4000.00 in actual damages and
$4 million in punitive damages.93 To prove actual damages of
$4000.00, Dr. Gore introduced evidence that the value of a
repainted BMW was approximately ten percent less than the value
of a new car that had not been damaged and repaired.94 To prove
his punitive damages claim, Dr. Gore introduced evidence that
"BMW had sold 983 refinished cars as new since 1983, including
fourteen in Alabama, without disclosing that the cars had been
repainted before sale at a cost of more than $300.00 per vehi-
cle."95 The jury found in favor of Dr. Gore and awarded him
$4000.00 in actual damages and $4 million in punitive damages,
finding that BMW's nondisclosure policy constituted "gross,
oppressive or malicious" fraud.96
BMW then filed a post-trial motion to set aside the punitive
damages award.97 Nevertheless, the trial judge denied BMW's
9 Id. Alabama's statute for fraud provides:
Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation
to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may
arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the
particular circumstances of the case.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993).
In BMW, the parties agreed that the cars were exposed to acid rain when
they were shipped from the manufacturing plant in Germany to the preparation
center in Brunswick, Georgia. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593 n.1.
9' BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
94 Id.
9' Id. He arrived at $4 million in punitive damages by multiplying his $4000
in actual damages by the approximately 1000 cars that were sold for more than
they were worth. Id.
116 Id. at 1594.
9 Id. In 1983, BMW adopted a nationwide policy for cars that were
damaged when manufactured or transported. The policy provided:
If the cost of repairing the damage exceeded three percent of the car's
suggested retail price, the car was placed in company service for a
period of time and then sold as used. If the repair cost did not exceed
three percent of the suggested retail price, the car was sold as new
without advising the dealer that any repairs had been made.
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post-trial motion that the award was unconstitutionally excessive
and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against
BMW 98 However, the court found that the jury improperly
computed the amount of punitive damages by multiplying Dr.
Gore's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in
other states and ordered a remittitur of $2 million. 99 BMW then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.'0 0
In a five to four ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the
Alabama Supreme Court's judgment and found that the $2 million
punitive damages award was grossly excessive and, therefore, an
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property in violation of the
Due Process Clause.'" This case represents the first time since
the Lochner era that the Supreme Court "overruled a punitive
damages award imposed under state law.' 102 Justice Stevens
Id. at 1593.
Thus, BMW did not disclose the damage or repair to the Birmingham dealer
because the cost of repainting Dr. Gore's car was only about 1.5% of its
suggested retail price. Id. BMW presented evidence to establish that its
nondisclosure policy was consistent with approximately 25 other states' laws. Id.
at 1594.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1595. The Alabama Supreme Court stated:
Although evidence of similar acts in other jurisdictions is admissible
as to the issue of a 'pattern and practice' of such acts .... this jury
could not use the number of similar acts that a defendant has com-
mitted in other jurisdictions as a multiplier when determining the dollar
amount of a punitive damages award. Such evidence may not be
considered in setting the size of the civil penalty, because neither the
jury nor the trial court had evidence before it showing in which states
the conduct was wrongful.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 932 (1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
100 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1589.
'0' Id. at 1604.
102 Dick Thornburgh, Punitive Damages After BMW v. Gore, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, July 26, 1996, at 4. Thornburgh pointed out that the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to reverse an Alabama punitive damages award, five
years earlier in Haslip on a procedural due process claim. Id. at 4 n.4 (citing
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)). The U.S. Supreme
Court in Haslip upheld the damage award because the trial and appellate court
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wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court.'0° Justices Breyer,
O'Connor and Souter concurred. 0 4 Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Ginsburg and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.0 5
B. The Supreme Court Decision: Justice Stevens' Majority
Opinion
Justice Stevens' majority opinion analyzed whether the punitive
damages award was excessive in light of the goal punitive damages
are designed to achieve. Punitive damages may be imposed "to
further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct
and deterring its repetition."' °6 Recognizing that a State may
protect its citizens by prohibiting deceptive trade practices including
requiring automobile distributors to disclose presale repairs that
affect the value of a new car, the Court noted, however, "that the
states need not, and in fact do not, provide such protection in a
uniform manner."'0 7 Thus, the Court adhered to the principle of
state sovereignty and the diverse policy judgments of state
lawmakers, by holding that a state could not impose its own policy
choice on neighboring states.108
After addressing the issue of extraterritorial punishment, the
Court concluded that the "Alabama Supreme Court . . .properly
eschewed reliance on BMW's out-of-state conduct, . . . and based
its remitted award solely on conduct that occurred within
Alabama."' 9 The Court then identified three guideposts to apply
adequately followed the traditional common-law method for assessing punitive
damage awards. Id. Further, Thornburgh pointed out that "BMW is the first case
since the Lochner era where the Court reversed a damage award based on a
substantive Due Process claim." Id.
'o' BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1592.
4 Id. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring).
'05 Id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 1595 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974)).
107 Id. at 1595-96.
'0' Id. at 1596-97.
'09 Id. at 1598. The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that although the jury
cannot use the number of sales in other states as a multiplier in computing the
amount of punitive damages, this evidence could still be used in determining the
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in order to determine whether a punitive damages award is
excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct;"0 (2) the ratio of punitive damages to the plaintiff's
actual or potential harm;"' and (3) comparison of civil and
criminal penalties for comparable misconduct." 2 The Court's
rationale for limiting excessive punitive damage awards is that the
U.S. Constitution requires that a person receive "notice of conduct
that will subject him or her to punishment and notice of the
severity of the penalty that a state may impose."
113
Applying these three guideposts, the Court concluded that the
$2 million award against BMW was "grossly excessive.""' 4 The
Court determined that BMW's disclosure policy was not suffi-
ciently reprehensible to justify a $2 million punitive damages award
where: (1) the record disclosed no deliberate false statements, acts
of affirmative misconduct or concealment of evidence of improper
motive;" '5 (2) there was no evidence that Dr. Gore or any other
BMW purchaser was threatened with any additional potential harm
by BMW's nondisclosure policy;" 6 and (3) the $2 million
economic sanction BMW was required to pay was inconsistent with
the statutory fines available in Alabama and other states for similar
misconduct. "7
C. Justice Breyer ' Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer's concurrence, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter, sought to clarify that while, procedurally, the $2 million
punitive damages award may not have been excessive, the award
did not pass constitutional muster, substantively."' He reiterated
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 1598 n.21.
'0 Id. at 1599.
. Id. at 1601.
112 Id. at 1603.
"' Id. at 1598.
114 id.
"' Id at 1601.
116 Id. at 1602.
'17 Id. at 1603.
118 Id. at 1604. Justice Breyer explained that members of the Court have
generally thought that if "fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a
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the principles set forth in Haslip, that "legal standards must provide
'reasonable constraints' within which 'discretion is exercised,'...
and this constitutional concern 'arises out of the basic unfairness of
depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property, through the applica-
tion of arbitrary coercion.""' 9 Further, he believes that the
application of law, "rather than a decisionmaker's caprice," can
provide citizens with notice of what conduct may subject them to
punishment. 2 ° Here, Breyer argued that the standards that the
Alabama courts applied were vague, open-ended and their applica-
tion risked arbitrary results.
Breyer articulated five reasons why the standards, as the
Alabama Supreme Court interpreted them, provided no uniform
application. First, Breyer argued that the Alabama statute that
permits punitive damages 2' provides no significant constraint
product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity." Id.
However, Justice Breyer believes that this presumption of validity is overcome
in BMW despite the fact that punitive damages procedures very similar to those
followed in BMW were not, by themselves, "fundamentally unfair." Id. (citing
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1991)).
" Id. at 1605 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-
21 (1991)).
120 Id. (citing Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
121 The Alabama punitive damages statute provides:
(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action,
except civil actions for wrongful death pursuant to Sections
6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud,
wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff. Nothing
contained in this article is to be construed as creating any
claim for punitive damages which is not now present under
the law of Alabama.
ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993).
Justice Breyer argued that the statute's definitions of "oppression, fraud,
wantonness, and malice" are too broad and these definitions authorize punitive
damages for too great a spectrum of conduct. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605. The
statute defines these terms as follows:
(b) As used in this article, the following definitions shall apply:
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because it does not contain a standard that identifies conduct
warranting very small, and conduct warranting very large, punitive
damages awards. 22 Second, Breyer argued that Alabama courts'
interpretation of the seven factors used to determine whether a jury
award was "grossly excessive" provided little constraint in
reviewing punitive damages awards in this case. 12 3 Third, Breyer
(1) Fraud. An intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact the concealing party
had a duty to disclose, which was gross, oppres-
sive, or malicious and committed with the intention
on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person or entity of property or legal rights or
otherwise causing injury.
(2) Malice. The intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse, either:
a. With an intent to injure the person or
property of another person or entity, or
b. Under such circumstances that the law
will imply an evil intent.
(3) Wantonness. Conduct which is carried on with a
reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others ....
(5) Oppression. Subjecting a person to cruel and unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of that person's
rights.
ALA. CODE § 6-11-20.
122 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605-06.
123 See infra note 157 (listing the seven factors of Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby,
539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989)). Two factors set forth in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby
were adopted by the majority in BMW: (1) that punitive damages awards must
bear a reasonable relationship to the actual and potential harm, and (2) the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599-1603.
While Breyer argued that in principle these factors might provide some
reasonable constraint on the amount of punitive damages awards, in actuality,
Breyer's discussion suggests that they do not offer much guidance. Id. at 1606
(noting that the standards, as the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted them,
provide no significant constraints against arbitrary results). For example, Breyer
stated that "to find a 'reasonable relationship' between purely economic harm
totaling $56,000 without significant evidence of future repetition, and a
punishment award of $2 million is to empty the 'reasonable relationship' test of
meaningful content." Id. Breyer, however, is not suggesting how to determine
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argued that Alabama should have applied an "economic" theory to
explain the $2 million award. 124 Fourth, Breyer could not find
any community understanding or historic practice that justifies the
awarding of $2 million for intentional misrepresentation. 25
Lastly, Breyer argued that there are no legislative enactments that
could limit the amount of discretion that was used in determining
the $2 million figure. 126 These arguments, combined, led Breyer
to conclude that the court and jury's discretion was not constrained,
and the $2 million punitive damages award was nothing more than
arbitrarily decided. 127 Further, he added that by not significantly
constraining the jury's discretion, Alabama is permitting its jurors
to act like legislators who attain state policy objectives. 128
whether this relationship exists. Rather, Breyer is conceding that the reasonable
relationship guidepost is a vague standard. See id.
124 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1607-08. Breyer's argument suggests that at least
three members of the Court believed that punitive damage awards should be
capped. Id. at 1607 (citing opinions by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor). Here,
Breyer suggests applying a mathematical formula, thereby further removing a
jury's discretion to determine punitive damages amounts. Id. For example, Breyer
suggests that we permit juries to calculate punitive damages by making a rough
estimate of global harm, dividing that estimate by a similarly rough estimate of
the number of successful lawsuits that would likely be brought, and by adding
generous attorneys and legal fees. Id.
125 Id. at 1608.
126 Id. at 1608-09. Here, Breyer is clearly advocating legislative caps on
punitive damage amounts. He cites to a Connecticut statute that limits punitive
damages to double compensatory damages in product liability cases. Id. at 1609;
see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1991). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.73(1) (West 1997) (limiting punitive damages to three times the amount
of compensatory damages in certain enumerated causes of action); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (Supp. 1996) (imposing a $250,000.00 cap in certain tort
actions); TEX. REV. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.0008 (West Supp.
1996) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of double the amount of
economic damages and an amount equal to the jury's determination of
noneconomic damages, or $200,000.00, except for certain enumerated causes of
action).
127 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1610.
128 Id. Breyer again argues that the amount of punitive damages should be
determined by legislatures and not by juries. See supra notes 124, 126 and
accompanying text (discussing how Breyer believes punitive damage awards can
be reduced).
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D. Justice Scalia ' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not provide
any substantive guarantees against "unreasonable" or "unfair"
punitive damage awards.129 Scalia adhered to the view he
expressed in TXO that "a state trial procedure that commits the
decision whether to impose punitive damages, and the amount, to
the discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review for
'reasonableness,' furnishes a defendant with all the process that is
'due.' 13
0
According to Scalia, the determination of punitive damage
amounts should be left to the jury.13' He argued that "at the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was well
understood that punitive damages represent the assessment by the
jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment
the defendant deserved."'32 When the Court concluded that "the
record in this case discloses no deliberate false statements, acts of
affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper
motive, it therefore, seemingly rejected the findings necessarily
made by the jury-that BMW had committed a fraud that was
'gross, oppressive, or malicious."", 133
Scalia found insupportable the Court's statement that Alabama
may not impose sanctions on BMW for conduct deemed lawful in
other states. 134 He argues that the Alabama Supreme Court should
consider conduct that was lawful for the purpose of assessing the
degree of reprehensibility of BMW's conduct. 135 He supported his
129 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
131 Id. at 1611.
32 Id. (citing Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886); Missouri v. Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363
(1852)).
131 Id. at 1613.
134 Id.
'31 Id. at 1612-13.
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opinion by stating, "[T]here is no basis for believing that Alabama
has sought to control conduct elsewhere."'' 36
Lastly, Scalia rejected applying the Court's guideposts 137
because the Court established federal standards that govern state
damages laws.'38 He criticized the guideposts as being too vague
to provide any guidance to judges. 139 Scalia also read into the
majority's opinion a "loophole" when the majority stated that "the
guideposts can be overridden, if necessary, to deter future mis-
conduct."' 4 ° This will enable state reviewing courts to uphold
awards as necessary for the "adequate protection of state con-
sumers. '""' Scalia succinctly summed up his opinion as follows:
The Court has constructed a framework that does not gen-
uinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and
lower courts-that does nothing at all except confer an
artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad
hoc determination that this particular award of punitive
damages was not "fair."' 42
E. Justice Ginsburg' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented
on the. ground that the U.S. Supreme Court intruded into a
traditional state area. 4 3 Justice Ginsburg does not believe that the
Court is "well equipped" to determine whether an award is
136 Id. at 1613. While it may not have been Alabama's intention to control
BMW's conduct elsewhere, the imposition of a $4 million punitive damages
award prompted BMW to change its disclosure policy nationwide. Id. at 1594.
After the $4 million verdict was returned, BMW instituted a nationwide policy
of full disclosure of all repairs. Id. Thus, Alabama indirectly regulated the
national level of paint job contracts.
'3 See supra Part II.B (setting forth BMW's guidepost test).
BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. It should be noted that if no "loophole" exists, Scalia's point was that
requiring state reviewing courts to "concoct rationalizations-whether within
the 'guideposts' or through the loophole-to justify the intuitive punitive
reactions of state juries" limits the role of state reviewing courts and juries. Id.
142 Id. at 1614.
141 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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constitutionally excessive. 44 Furthermore, Ginsburg believes that
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion will not alter how state review-
ing courts are evaluating punitive damage awards because the Court
itself repeated that it brings to the task no "mathematical formula"
or "categorical approach."' 45 Ginsburg pointed out that the
standards used by Alabama courts to determine excessiveness,
specifically Green Oil Co. v Hornsby's seven factors, 4 6 were
already held by the Court to "impose a sufficiently definite and
meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in
awarding punitive damages.',
4 7
III. AN ADVISORY OPINION FOR STATE COURTS TO FOLLOW
A review of how courts have applied the three guideposts
articulated in BMW, illustrates that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
taken a firm position on punitive damages.' The vagueness and
difficulty in applying the guideposts suggest that the Court is
against a standardized cap on punitive damages, due to the various
factors at work in each particular case. 149 The end result is that
after BMW, tort reform on a national level, is exactly where it was
in 1996 when President Clinton vetoed the Common Sense Product
Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996.50 Caps on punitive damage
144 Id. at 1617.
145 Id.
146 See infra note 157 (setting forth Hornsby's seven factors).
14' BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1616 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 22 (1991)).
148 See Mckee, supra note 85, at 217 (1996) (opining that there will not be
any "tort reform" by federal or state legislatures as a result of BMW).
"4' The third guidepost, however, deference to civil or criminal penalties that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct, in essence, serves as a cap on
punitive damages awards. The amount of civil or criminal penalties represent
state legislative determinations on the egregiousness of the conduct and the type
and degree of punishment the wrongdoer owes to society. The penalties serve as
a benchmark to determine whether the punitive damage award is excessive.
so H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). Title I, section 108 of the vetoed
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996 provided:
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awards, if any, must now be determined by state legislatures.15'
Despite the fact that the Court has passed on the opportunity to set
caps on punitive damages,' the application of BMW guideposts
(a) General Rule. Punitive damages may, to the extent permitted
by applicable state law, be awarded against a defendant if the
claimant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
conduct carried out by the defendant with a conscious,
flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of others was the
proximate cause of the harm that is the subject of the action
in any product liability action.
(b) Limitation on Amount.
(1) In General. The amount of punitive damages that
may be awarded in an action described in subsec-
tion (a) may not exceed the greater of-
(A) 2 times the sum of the amount awarded
to the claimant for economic and non-
economic loss; or
(B) $250,000.
Id.
Prior to President Clinton's veto and currently in the United States, limits
on punitive damage awards vary from state to state. See James Podgers,
Throwing Caps Out of the Ring, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 48 (comparing
different state statutes that limit punitive damage awards). See also BMW, 116
S. Ct. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (surveying state legislative activity
regarding punitive damages). The introduction of the Common Sense Products
Liability Legal Reform Act, which provided for a uniform federal system for
capping punitive damage awards, stirred debate amongst consumer advocates and
tort reformers. See Richard Mahoney, Editorial, Cause to Overturn on Liability,
WASH. TIMES, May 7, 1996, at A12 (listing five reasons why Congress should
override President Clinton's veto); Laurence A. Marder, Editorial, Liability
Reform is Anti-Consumer, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 1996, at 9A (opining that "the
law will destroy consumer rights for the convenient protection of powerful
business interests"); John M. Waltersdorf, Editorial, Product Liability Law is
Good for America, BALT. SUN, May 11, 1996, at 9A (opining that the bill will
make it easier in Maryland for the victims of product-related injuries to win).
' See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (surveying three
different state approaches to punitive damages: (1) caps on punitive damage
awards; (2) allocation of punitive damages to state agencies; and (3) mandatory
bifurcation of liability and punitive damages determinations).
152 The most that can be gathered from BMW about a proper amount of
punitive damages is that a $2 million punitive damages award is excessive for
suppression of a material fact when the cost of repair was 1.5% of the price of
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does, however, provide some consistency in the law when assessing
punitive damages. An examination of the cases decided in light of
BMW illustrates attempts by federal courts to make sense of state
law on punitive damages while grappling with the three guideposts
set out in BMW, in order to help determine the standard that will
identify constitutionally excessive punitive damage awards.'53 The
three guideposts set out in BMW are: (1) the degree of reprehensib-
ility of the conduct involved; 54 (2) the ratio of the punitive
damages award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff;' 55 and
(3) the civil and criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.'56
While the Court articulated a method for determining punitive
damages, the question remains-how do courts apply these
guideposts and what do they mean?'57
the car. See Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456 (Idaho 1996)
(using the facts of BMW as its benchmark to affirm a punitive damages award).
153 However, state appellate courts seem less constrained to limit punitive
damage awards than do the federal courts. See Thomas R. Newman & Steven J.
Ahmuty, Jr., Post 'BMW' Punitive Damages Decisions-Part I, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
29, 1997, at 3.
154 BMW, 116 S. Ct at 1599.
"' Id. at 1601.
156 Id. at 1603.
117 These guideposts are not novel articulations by the U.S. Supreme Court.
They have been used by courts in the past for determining the reasonableness of
a punitive damages award. See, e.g., Green Oil Co. v. Homsby, 539 So. 2d 218,
223-24 (Ala. 1989); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (1991),
aff'd, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). For example, both the appellate and Supreme
Court of Alabama, applied the seven factors articulated in Hornsby to determine
excessiveness, two of which are identical to the BMW guideposts. These seven
factors are: (1) punitive damages should be reasonably related to the actual and
potential harm from the defendant's conduct; (2) the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct should be considered; (3) the defendant should
recognize an economic loss; (4) the defendant's net worth should be considered;
(5) costs of litigation should be considered to encourage plaintiffs to file suits;
(6) punitive damage awards should be mitigated by the amount of criminal
sanctions imposed; and (7) punitive damages should be mitigated if there have
been other civil actions against the same defendant based on the same conduct.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 624 (Ala. 1994), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 932 (1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (citing Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989)).
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A. The First Guidepost: The Degree of Reprehensibility
To determine the reasonableness of a punitive damages award
the Court gave the following guidance to courts: "[S]ome wrongs
are more blameworthy than others; nonviolent crimes are less
serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence;
Similarly in Utah, the appellate court applied seven factors in assessing
punitive damage amounts, one of which is applied in BMW. See, e.g., Ong Int'l
v. 11 th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 458 (Utah 1993); Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808;
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984). These factors are:
(1) the relative wealth of the defendant;
(2) the nature of the alleged misconduct;
(3) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct;
(4) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others;
(5) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct;
(6) the relationship of the parties; and
(7) the amount of actual damages awarded.
Utah Foam Prods. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 930 F. Supp. 513 (D. Utah 1996) (citing
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (1991), aff'd, 860 P.2d 937
(Utah 1993).
While the Utah courts are aware that Utah's Supreme Court precedent
indicated seven factors that should be considered in determining the amount of
punitive damages, Utah's courts have done little more that list these factors. See
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808. The court in Crookston stated that:
No relative weights have been assigned [the seven factors], and no
standards or formulas have been established for properly evaluating
them when making an award or when reviewing the propensity of a
jury award. This makes such an enterprise highly problematic for judge
and jury. The finder of fact has no guidance on how much weight to
give each factor or even how the factors should be assessed. And
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial court that there is any sort of
limit or ceiling on an award.
Id.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to set a mathematical formula for
detecting constitutionally excessive punitive awards, the Court is advising other
courts to carefully scrutinize awards by applying the three guideposts. BMW, 116
S. Ct. at 1602. Cf. Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 145 (1996) (opining
that the Court's analysis gives legislatures and courts little guidance to determine
unconstitutionally excessive punitive damage awards).
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'trickery and deceit' are more reprehensible than negligence." '
An examination of case law illustrates that a trial or appellate court
applying this guidepost will substitute a jury's finding with that of
a judge.'59 This process both undermines the purpose of a jury,
to decide issues of fact where reasonable people can differ, and
undercuts the American notion that one's peers decide the degree
of reprehensibility of particular conduct, especially where the
legislature has not spoken.
In BMW, the jury found that BMW suppressed a material fact
that Alabama law obligated it to communicate to prospective
purchasers and, based on this finding, fixed an amount of punitive
damages. 6  The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the punitive
damages award because the record did not disclose deliberate false
statements, acts of affirmative misconduct or concealment of
evidence of improper motive.' 6' The fact that both the Alabama
I" BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-93
(1983) and TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
(1993)).
9 For example, in Florez v. Delbovo, the court reduced the punitive damage
award from $750,000.00 to $277,500.00 after examiningthe jury's determination.
939 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (N.D. I11. 1996). The court did not deny that the
plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages because the record showed the
defendant acted wrongly toward the plaintiff. Id. at 1347. The court, however,
reduced the award after making its own determinations about the defendant's
reprehensibility. Id. at 1348.
160 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593-94.
161 Id. at 1601. The Court in BMW asserted many arguments that in
hindsight suggest an award of $4000.00 in compensatory damages and -$4
million, or even the reduced amount of $2 million, in punitive damages for
failure to disclose that paint finish on a new automobile was repaired is
"excessive." Id. at 1594-1600. For example, before the BMW action was filed,
BMW's nondisclosure policy had never been adjudged unlawful. Id. at 1594.
Furthermore, the Court argued that "a review of the text of disclosure statutes
reveals that a corporate executive could reasonably interpret the disclosure
requirements as establishing safe harbors." Id. at 1600. The Court cited
California's disclosure statute which defines "'material' damage to a motor
vehicle as damage requiring repairs costing in excess of three percent of the
suggested retail price or $500, whichever is greater." Id. (citing CAL. VEH.
CODE. § 9990 (West Supp. 1997)).
Incidentally, BMW's nondisclosure policy is unlawful in Alabama today.
During Alabama's 1993 regular session, while the BMW litigation was pending,
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Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court assessed the punitive
damages award in light of the degree of reprehensibility of BMW's
conduct and decided differently makes it difficult for courts to
properly apply this guidepost in the future. 62 An examination of
the Alabama legislature enacted laws requiring manufacturers to disclose those
repairs costing more than the greater of $500.00 or three percent of the
manufacturer's suggested retail price. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 623. See ALA. CODE
§ 8-19-5 (22) (1993). If this was the law in Alabama before 1993, BMW would
have been liable because the cost of repainting Dr. Gore's car was $601.37, only
about 1.5% of its suggested retail price. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
162 In determining the degree of reprehensibility of BMW's conduct, the
Alabama Supreme Court considered the duration that BMW failed to disclose
that it was repainting cars, whether BMW was aware of the actual and potential
harm resulting from its conduct, whether BMW attempted to conceal its practice
and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct. BMW, 646 So. 2d at
625. The court determined that:
The evidence shows that BMW adopted the policy of nondisclosure in
1983 [if the cost of repair did not exceed three percent of the
suggested retail price, the car was sold as new without advising the
dealer that any repairs had been made] and that the policy applied to
the sale of all automobiles in all states. Based on this evidence, we
conclude that Gore satisfactorily proved that BMW NA engaged in a
pattern and practice of knowingly failing to disclose damage to new
cars, even though the damage affected their value, and that BMW NA
followed this policy for several years. Based on that evidence, we
conclude that Gore satisfied the burden placed on him to show that
BMW NA's conduct was reprehensible.
Id.
The problem with this finding by the court is that BMW's nondisclosure
policy in 1983, in effect when Dr. Gore purchased his car in 1990, was not
unlawful in every state. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1600. As the Supreme Court pointed
out in BMW, "the States need not, and in fact do not, provide such protection in
a uniform manner." Id. at 1596.
[T]hen as now, BMW's policy comported with the statutory disclosure
thresholds of numerous states. At present fully 22 states ... have
adopted explicit disclosure thresholds that call for disclosure only of
repairs costing more than 3% of the MSRP [manufacturer's suggested
retail price].
Brief for the Petitioner at 39, BMW of N. Am., Inc, v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996) (No. 94-896).
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Alabama Supreme Court and
held that BMW's conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant
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cases applying this guidepost after BMW reveals that courts are not
sure how to assess the degree of reprehensibility and, therefore, the
role this guidepost plays in assessing the amount of punitive
damages remains questionable.
In Florez v Delbovo'63 and Rush v Scott Specialty Gases,
Inc.,164 for example, both courts held that the jury's determination
of punitive damages was excessive. 165 In Florez, the court,
admitting that the BMW decision did not give much guidance about
imposition of a $2 million punitive damages award. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1601.
While the degree of reprehensibility analysis of the Court is itself replete with
holes, the Court makes a sound argument that while "we accept.., the jury's
finding that BMW suppressed a material fact which Alabama law obligated it to
communicate to prospective purchasers of repainted cars in that State ... the
omission of a material fact may be less reprehensible than a deliberate false
statement." Id. The hole this author is referring to is the Court's failure to
address Dr. Gore's argument in support of his claim that BMW's conduct was
particularly reprehensible because of BMW's nationwide practice of non-
disclosure of repairs to its cars. Id. at 1599. Dr. Gore argued that "the state
disclosure statutes supplement, rather than supplant, existing remedies for breach
of contract and common-law fraud." Id. While the Court mentioned Hines v.
Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. in a footnote, which held that whether a defendant
has a duty to disclose is a question of fact "for the jury to determine," the Court
never explained in light of this decision why it could second-guess and even
overturn a jury's finding. Id. at 1600 n.27 (referring to Hines v. Riverside
Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 655 So. 2d 909, 918 (Ala. 1994)).
Thus, there are two reasons why two courts can produce different results:
either one court was wrong or it is a close case open to different interpretations.
Where it is the former, the appellate process serves to solve any inaccuracy
because it is designed to correct what was done wrong by lower courts. However,
the latter result presents more difficulty where reasonable persons can differ.
Unfortunately, in either case the bottom line is whether the U.S. Supreme Court
hears the case. See Nim M. Razook, Jr., Legal and Extralegal Barriers to
Federal Product Liability Reform, 32 AM. Bus. L.J., 541, 568 (1995) (noting
that the Product Liability Fairness Act imposes additional burdens on the U.S.
Supreme Court of having to choose whether to grant or reject writs of certiorari
to review lower court interpretations of the act and whether to affirm or overrule
state high court decisions).
163 939 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. I11. 1996).
164 930 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
165 Florez, 939 F. Supp. at 1349; Rush, 930 F. Supp. at 202. Both cases
involved claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-I to -17 (1994).
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determining the excessiveness of punitive damage awards,
concluded that the facts of the Florez case suggested that the
defendant's conduct at issue was only "slightly more reprehensible
than the conduct in BAW."' 66 Therefore, the court continued by
stating that, "the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct only
warrants 'somewhat-more-than a modest' award of punitive
damages."' 67 Similarly, the court in Rush determined that the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct was closer to
the "very bad" side of the scale rather than the "completely amoral"
side.'68 As exemplified by Florez and Rush, courts are apt to use
their discretion to determine the degree of reprehensibility of a
defendant's conduct and are also apt to supplement their findings
with the findings of the jury.'69
B. The Second Guidepost.: Ratio
Another factor for determining whether a punitive damages
award is excessive is "whether there is a 'reasonable relationship'
between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result
from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred."' 7 ° While the U.S. Supreme Court stated that this is a
factor to be considered, the Court balked at setting appropriate
ratios for different kinds of wrongs.' 7' The Court remained
66 Florez, 939 F. Supp. at 1348 (stating that "[t]his does not give lower
courts much guidance on determining the excessiveness of punitive damage
awards for 'more reprehensible' conduct . .
167 Id.
168 Rush, 930 F. Supp. at 201.
169 See, e.g., Florez, 939 F. Supp. at 1349 (reducing jury's punitive damage
award from $750,000.00 to $277,500.00); Rush, 930 F. Supp. at 202 (stating that
jury was adequately instructed to determine punitive damages amount, however,
holding jury's verdict as to punitive damages excessive); Molenaar v. Frank, 553
N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (reinstating jury's determination that
punitive damages are appropriate but remanding to the district court to determine
the amount); South Carolina Farm Bureau v. Love Chevrolet, 478 S.E.2d 57, 60
(S.C. 1996) (noting that it is within the trial judge's discretion to reduce the
jury's assessment of punitive damages).
170 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1602 (1996).
171 Id. at 1601.
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steadfast on its previous decision that "[w]e need not, and indeed
we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitu-
tionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case."' 72 Therefore, the only guidance given to state
appellate courts is to take into consideration the egregiousness of
the defendant's act, the actual harm that occurred and the harm
likely to result from the defendant's conduct when deciding
whether the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages is
constitutional. 17
3
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Haslip that a
punitive damages award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages may be "close to the line.' 74 Two years
later, in TXO, the Court upheld a $10 million punitive damages
award, a figure 526 times the actual damages. 75 Subsequently,
the Court in BMW justified this inconsistency, explaining that the
punitive damages award affirmed in TXO, in actuality, was only
about ten times the actual damages when relying on the future harm
to the victim that would have ensued if TXO' conduct
continued. 76 This reasoning led the Court in BMW to conclude
172 Id. at 1602 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18
(1991)).
113 Id. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained:
Low compensatory awards may properly support a higher ratio than
high compensatory awards, if for example a particularly egregious act
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher
ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect
or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult
to determine.
Id.
171 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991). See
Mckee, supra note 85, at 179 (stating that this language demonstrates that "the
Haslip court believed that substantive due process might limit the amount of
some punitive damage awards").
'S TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
176 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
[E]ven if the actual value of the "potential harm" to respondents is not
between $5 million and $8.3 million, but is closer to $4 million, or $2
million, or even $1 million, the disparity between the punitive award
and the potential harm does not, in our view, "jar one's constitutional
sensibilities."
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that the $2 million in punitive damages awarded to Dr. Gore by the
Alabama Supreme Court, which was five hundred times the amount
of his actual harm as determined by the jury, was too great a
difference where there was no evidence of potential harm by
BMW's nondisclosure policy.'77 A review of cases decided in
light of BMW suggests that the amount of punitive damages
"reasonably related" to actual damages depends on the individual
court's approach to the proportionality requirement."'
One approach to the proportionality requirement has been to set
forth a specific ratio. In Utah Foam Products Co. v. Upjohn
Co., 17 9 the court reduced a ratio of punitive damages to actual
damages from seventeen to one to two to one.' A jury found
Upjohn liable for making fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations to Utah Foam, a purchaser of isocyanate. 8'
when it manufactured and sold isocyanate.8 2 The jury awarded
the plaintiff $313,593.00 in compensatory damages and $5.5
million in punitive damages." 3 After applying the guideposts
articulated in BMW, and the "reasonable and rational" scrutiny
required under Utah law,"4 the district court reduced the award
to $607,146.22," s5 reasoning that the "'general rule' in Utah is
that ratios above three to one for smaller awards (below $100,000)
are excessive, and that 'the acceptable ratio' appears lower than
three to one for larger awards (above $100,000).,, 186 Courts may
Id. at 1602 n.34 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. at 462; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
177 Id.
178 The term "proportionality requirement" refers to the ratio of the punitive
damages award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff. Id. at 1601.
171 930 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D. Utah 1996).
80 Id. at 532.
"8' Isocyanate is the radical N=C=O. It is any of the class of compounds
containing this radical, some of which are used in making polyurethane. THE
NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1424 (4th ed. 1993).
182 Upjohn, 930 F. Supp. at 515-16.
183 id.
184 See supra note 157 (discussing the Utah law regarding punitive damage
award determinations).
185 Upjohn, 930 F. Supp. at 532.
186 Id. at 526. In Upjohn, the court quoted the Utah Supreme Court in
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award punitive damages at a ratio greater than three to one if the
trial court explains its reasoning in connection with Utah's seven
standard factors,' 87 or in terms of some other compelling
factor.'88 In Upjohn, where there was no probability that the
defendant might act in the same way in the future because it sold
its entire isocyanate operation, the Utah Supreme Court, therefore,
reduced the jury verdict award from a ratio of seventeen to one to
two to one, in accordance with Utah's standard.
1 89
Another approach to proportionality, while not setting specific
ratios, is deferential to the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in
Haslip that a punitive damages award of four times the amount of
compensatory damages may be "close to the line," but nonetheless
constitutional. 9 ° In Patterson v PHP Healthcare Corp.,
1 91
the court vacated and remanded a 6 2 to 1 punitive damages award
Crookston: "We have indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios
of less than 3 to 1." Id. at 526 n.25 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 810 (1991), aff'd, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993)). In response, the Upjohn
court read this statement by the Utah Supreme Court as indicating that even
awards with ratios of less than three to one may be reduced. Id. at 526; see also
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1993) ("[A]n award
exceeding the patterns of ratios observed in our prior cases raises a presumption
that the award is excessive and that a failure by the trial court to reduce the
award or order a new trial is an abuse of discretion.").
187 See supra note 157 (setting forth Utah's factors for assessing punitive
damage awards).
88 Upjohn, 930 F. Supp. at 526 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1993)). For example, Utah courts consider whether the
defendant's conduct is deliberate, egregious and malicious. Id. at 526 n.28. The
Utah Supreme Court on remand in Crookston upheld a jury verdict awarding the
plaintiffs a five to one ratio of punitive damages to actual damages upon theories
of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and fair dealing. Crookston, 860
P.2d at 941. The defendant's conduct in Crookston was found to be deliberate,
egregious and malicious where the defendant insurance company breached its
insurance contract by failing to pay in full plaintiff's claim for property damage,
and the defendants knew that the Crookstons would be exposed to "ruinous
bankruptcy" as a result of its actions. Id. at 940.
,89 Upjohn, 930 F. Supp. at 528.
190 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1602 (1996) (citing
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)).
'9' 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
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in an employment discrimination case."' The court blankly stated
that the "punitive damage assessment bears no 'reasonable
relationship' to the compensatory damage award in this case. ' 93
The court's only support for this statement was that the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages was 6 to 1 and the Supreme
Court regards four to one to be "close to the line.'
94
Other courts have refused to set forth a rigid ratio. For example,
in Jannone v Harris,95 the court interpreting BMW ratio
guidepost stated that the principle that punitive damages must bear
a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages may be
complicated by having to factor in any potential future harm from
the defendant's conduct' 96 and the financial circumstances of the
defendant.'97 The Jannone court reasoned that failing to take
these two considerations into account would undermine the
deterrent function of punitive damages and, therefore, the court did
192 In Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp, a mental health technician and
head nurse of P.H.P. Healthcare brought suit against their employer and
supervisor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e-3 for race discrimination
and retaliatory discharge. Id. at 930. For punitive damages to be awarded under
§ 1981, the employer and supervisor must have acted with malice or reckless
indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights. ld. at 942. Applying the
statute, the court dismissed the punitive damages award against the employer and
upheld a punitive damages award against the supervisor, however, the court noted
that the amount of the award against the supervisor did not comply with BMW.
Id. at 943 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-99
(1996)).
193 Id.
194 Id. See Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (N.D. I11. 1996)
(stating that a thirteen to one ratio of punitive to actual damages is clearly
"beyond the line" in terms of constitutional propriety and like BMW, the actual
harm was probably identical or very similar to the potential harm).
" 941 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
196 Id. at 414. While courts rely on this factor as a justification for reducing
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, they fail to explain how
they arrived at the reduced ratio. See Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 930 F.
Supp. 194, 201-02 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding a thirteen to one ratio of punitive
damages to actual damages excessive where plaintiff in a Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-I to -17, action was awarded all her lost wages and benefits, her past,
present and future mental suffering as well as the cost of future psychiatric
treatment, and there was no additional potential harm).
197 lannone, 941 F. Supp. at 414.
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not apply a set ratio.'98 While the court declined to set proportion-
ality parameters, it did not give any indication of how it determined
in lannone that the "ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages of the jury award was clearly disproportionate."' 99
The failure of the U.S. Supreme Court in BMW to set a
mathematical formula has therefore rendered the proportionality
requirement's application meaningless for some courts. While
courts have noted high ratios between punitive damage awards and
compensatory damages, they subsequently applied other factors to
set the ratio into perspective.2 °° Problems arise when no factor
seems to lend itself to providing consistency and fairness in the law
and, therefore, impedes on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of due process of law.20 ' Fortunately, the third guidepost of
198 Id.
... Id. at 415. The plaintiff in lannone v. Harris sued her employer for
creating a hostile work environment that constituted sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 408. The jury
awarded the plaintiff $62,000.00 in back pay, $5000.00 in compensatory damages
and $250,000.00 in punitive damages. Id. While the $250,000.00 punitive
damage award was 50 times the award of $5000.00, the court reasoned that two
factors explain this high ratio:
First, unlike the assessment made in a traditional personal injury
action, the magnitude of injury to the plaintiff in a Title VII action is
not measured solely by the award of compensatory damages; it is also
reflected in the size of the back pay award. . . . Here, even after
adjustment to conform to the record, the back pay award is more than
$20,000. Thus, the ratio of punitive damages as awarded by the jury
to compensation for actual harm to Ms. lannone is approximately ten-
to-one, not fifty-to-one. Second the jury was entitled to consider the
size of Frederic R. Harris in imposing punitive damages.
Id. at 415.
Although the Iannone court identified these factors they did not explain how
they arrived at a $50,000.00 punitive damage award, which was two times
greater than the actual damages awarded. Id.
200 See Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801, 810-11 (S.D.
1996) (noting that the punitive damage award of $750,000.00 is 30 times the
amount of compensatory damages and then moving on to other factors, refusing
to set a specific ratio); see also lannone, 941 F. Supp. at 414 (stating that no
rigid ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages can be applied).
2"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra Parts III.A-B (illustrating
courts' application of BMW's guideposts).
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BMW, looking to legislatively enacted statutes and civil penalties,
lends itself to providing consistency in the law when determining
the amount of punitive damages.
C. The Third Guidepost: Sanctions for Comparable
Misconduct
The third indicium of excessiveness of a punitive damages
award involves a comparison of the punitive damages award to the
civil or criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.0 2 The
Court noted that a lesser deterrent, rather than a higher punitive
damage award, might adequately protect a state's citizens from
future misconduct.2 3 In Alabama, the maximum civil penalty
authorized for a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is
$2000.00.204 Therefore, the Supreme Court in BMW concluded
that the $2 million economic sanction imposed upon BMW was
greater than the statutory fines available in Alabama and in other
states.20 5 Application of this guidepost illustrates that the Court
is essentially placing caps on the amount of punitive damage
awards. While this is the only message about the Court's position
on punitive damages, this guidepost undercuts the argument that
punitive damages serve a deterrent and retributive purpose.20 6
202 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1603 (1996).
203 Id.
204 Id. Alabama prohibits 23 deceptive acts in trade or commerce. ALA.
CODE § 8-19-5 (1993). Alabama requires manufacturers to disclose those repairs
costing more than the greater of $500.00 or three percent of the manufacturer's
suggested retail price. Id. § 8-19-5(22)(c). Alabama Code section 8-19-11
provides:
Any person who is knowingly engaging in or has knowingly engaged
in any act or practice declared unlawful by Section 8-19-5 shall forfeit
and pay a civil penalty of not more than $2,000 per violation ....
Id. § 8-19-11 (1993).
205 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603. The Court noted that other states authorize
more severe sanctions, requiring wrongdoers to pay $5000.00 to $10,000.00
penalties. Id.
206 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1269, 1317 (1993) (noting that "the most frequently recognized function of
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A number of cases applying BMW, involved claims pursuant to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.207 When determining a proper
amount of punitive damages, courts find these cases relatively easy
to decide because the legislature has already determined the
egregiousness of the conduct and the amount likely to deter.2°8
Problems will arise, however, when there is no comparable
statute. Continental Trend Resources Inc. v OXY USA,2 °9 the first
case decided after remand in light of BMW, presented such a
situation. In OXY, producers and marketers of natural and liquid
gas sued the operator of a gas-gathering and transmission pipeline
system for tort claims for interference with contracts and
punitive damages is to prevent and deter further misconduct").
207 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.
1996); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 1996); Patterson
v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996); Florez v. Delbovo, 939
F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Il. 1996); Hearn v. General Elec. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Ala. 1996); Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family, No. 93-C7785, 1996
WL 327965 (N.D. 111. June 12, 1996); Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 930
F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
20' Title 42, Section 198 1 a(b)(3) of the United States Code provides:
[T]he amount of punitive damages awarded under this section,
shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14
and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100
and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200
and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year,
$300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
209 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996).
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prospective business advantage.21 ° When discussing BMW third
guidepost the court noted: "OXY's misconduct involved a violation
of common law tort duties that do not lend themselves to a
comparison with statutory penalties." '' Nevertheless, the court
held that large punitive damage awards in other states provided
OXY with notice that its actions could lead to payment of large
punitive damage awards.2"2
D. State Courts
After its decision in BMW, the U.S. Supreme Court issued five
"GVR" orders granting certiorari, vacating the judgment and
remanding the case.213 While the five GVR orders of state court
opinions have not been decided after remand as of this writing,
there have been a number of cases decided in state courts since the
BMW decision.21 4 An examination of these cases reveals that state
20 Id. at 635.
211 Id. at 641.
212 Id.
213 See Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 67 F.3d 314 (1 1th Cir. 1995),
vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996) (mem.) (issuing "GVR" order); Continental
Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 44 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1995), aff'd,
101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996). See Part III.C (discussing Continental Trend
Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc.).
Five state court cases were remanded in light of BMW. See Life Ins. Co. of
Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 288 (mem.)
(issuing "GVR" order); Alabama Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 681 So.
2d 1040 (Ala. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1872 (1996) (mem.) (issuing "GVR"
order); Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 674 So. 2d 24 (Ala. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 1843 (1996) (mem.) (issuing "GVR" order); Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Crocker, 667 So. 2d 688 (Ala. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1872 (1996) (mem.)
(issuing "GVR" order); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 891 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994) (writ denied), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996) (mem.) (issuing "GVR"
order). See Mckee, supra note 85, at 198-201 (summarizing the above cases and
predicting their outcomes).
214 Fant v. Champion Aviation, Inc., Nos. 1951013, 1951119, 1997 WL
37005 (Ala. Jan. 31, 1997); American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d
1337 (Ala. 1996); City of Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29 (Ala. 1996);
Custard Ins. Adjustors, Inc. v. Youngblood, 686 So. 2d 211 (Ala. 1996); Ex
parte Exide Corp., 678 So. 2d 773 (Ala. 1996); Exparte Knotts, 686 So. 2d 486
(Ala. 1996); Loyal Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Mattiace, 679 So. 2d 229 (Ala.), cert.
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courts are doing little more than paying lip service to BMW.
However, in some cases, while state courts are not applying the
guideposts as diligently as their federal counterparts, the logic of
the BMW guideposts is imbedded in state court precedent.215
Thus, it can hardly be said that the BMW decision has "usurped
power that belongs to states. ',2 1
6
BMW seems to have little effect in substantially reducing
punitive damage awards in personal injury litigation.2 7 In Wilson
v IBP, Inc.,21 8 the plaintiff, after injuring his back while work-
ing, brought an action in district court against a registered nurse
who was employed by IBP, Inc., for violating her fiduciary duty by
virtue of her position at IBP.2 19 Plaintiff claimed that the nurse
denied, 117 S. Ct. 361 (1996); McCullar v. Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co.,
687 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 682 So. 2d 392
(Ala. 1996); Sheffield v. Andrews, 679 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 610 (1996); Means v. Kenny Shoe Corp., Civ. B093040, 1996 WL
617324 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1996); Stevens v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., No. A065995, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1645 (1996); Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp. v. Rivera, 683 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Southeastern Sec.
Ins. Co. v. Hotle, 474 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Kunewa v. Joshua, 924
P.2d 559 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d
456 (Idaho 1996); SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 672 N.E.2d 341
(111. App. Ct. 1996); Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa 1996);
Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Call v.
Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997); Green
Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Preferred Packaging, Inc., No. 83343, 1996 WL 625172
(Okla. Oct. 30, 1996); Nichols v. Mid Continent Pipe Line Co., No. 84130, 1996
WL 589119 (Okla. Oct. 15, 1996); South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Love Chevrolet, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1996); Schaffer v. Jones & Co., 552
N.W.2d 810 (S.D. 1996); Shippen v. Parrott, 553 N.W.2d 503 (S.D. 1996);
Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Prods., 929 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1996); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Ellender, 934 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (no writ); State v.
Miller, 476 S.E.2d 535 (W.Va. 1996); Management Computer Servs., Inc. v.
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 557 N.W.2d 67 (Wis. 1996).
215 Seesupra notes 19, 157 (illustrating how BMW's guideposts are not novel
articulations by the Court).
216 Court is Right, supra note 6, at A60.
2,7 Mckee, supra note 85, at 204 (opining that plaintiffs will argue that BMW
has little effect on personal injury litigation).
218 558 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa 1996).
219 Id. at 135-36.
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tried to show that he was not following his treatment program in
order to deny him worker's compensation benefits.22 IBP was a
named defendant who was responsible for the actions of the
nurse.22 ' The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him
$4000.00 in compensatory and $15 million in punitive
damages.222 When the court ordered a remittitur of the amount of
punitive damages award in excess of $100,000.00 and the plaintiff
rejected the remittitur conditions, the court ordered a new trial to
determine the amount of punitive damages that should be assessed
against either or both of the defendants. 2 3 The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed the compensatory damage award but reduced the
punitive damages award to $2 million.224 The court reviewed the
evidence and determined that a reasonable juror could have found
that the nurse's conduct "constituted a willful and wanton disregard
of the rights and safety of [the plaintiff]. ' '225 While the court went
through a lengthy discussion of federal and state cases guiding
punitive damage determinations, including BMW, the court did not
individually apply the three guideposts. Rather, the only indication
of how the court arrived at the $2 million award was after noting
the financial position of 1BP.226
Similarly, Mobil Oil Corp. v Ellender227 and Call v
Heard228 are two personal injury cases that do no more than cite
BMW and review punitive damage amounts based on the standards
traditionally employed by each court's individual state. In Ellender,
the plaintiff brought suit alleging that Mobil's gross negligence
caused Mr. Ellender's death by the presence, use and control of
220 Id. at 136.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 148.
225 Id. at 144.
226 Id. at 148. The court stated that the financial position of IBP is a relevant
factor for deterrence purposes. The court noted that IBP is the largest producer
of fresh beef and pork in the world. It employs 29,000 people, and in 1993 had
net sales of $11.6 billion and a net worth of $600 million. Id.
227 934 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (no writ).
22 925 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
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benzene at Mobil's facility.229 The jury awarded the plaintiff
$622,888.97 for compensatory and $6 million in punitive damages
against Mobil. 23' The trial judge applied the punitive damage
"cap" required by Texas law, reducing punitive damages to
approximately $4.5 million .2 1 Further, the court noted that Texas
precedent also required the court to "clearly explain 'why'... [the]
evidence does or does not support the punitive damage award., 23
2
While the court did not refer in its analysis to BMW guideposts,
or compare the facts at issue to those in BMW, it did discuss the
degree of Mobil's culpability and deferred to the legislative
enactment capping punitive damages. 233 The court affirmed the
punitive damage award. 34 Thus, Ellender is an example of how
the BMW decision has not "usurped power that belongs to
states.,
235
In Call, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a non-jury award
of $9.5 million compensatory and $9.5 million punitive damages in
a wrongful death case against a drunk driver.236 The court did not
229 Ellender, 934 S.W.2d at 449.
230 Id. at 443.
231 See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West Supp. 1997)
(capping punitive damage awards at two times the amount of actual damages,
plus the amount of noneconomic damages not in excess of $750,000.00 or
$200,000.00). The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the punitive damage award
after applying factors set out by the Texas Supreme Court. See Alamo National
Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981) (often referred to as the "Kraus
factors"). The factors to consider in determining whether an award of punitive
damages is excessive are:
(1) the nature of the wrong;
(2) the character of the conduct involved;
(3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer;
(4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned; and
(5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of
justice and propriety.
Id.
232 Ellender, 934 S.W.2d at 457.
233 Id. at 459, 463.
234 Id. at 463.
235 Court is Right, supra note 6, at A60.
236 Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Mo. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
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apply BMW because the defendant raised a procedural due process
claim and did not challenge the excessiveness of the award.237
However, if BMW was applied it is questionable whether the court
would uphold the punitive damages award. Justice Price, dissenting
in part, stated that "[t]he trial court assumed a one to one relation-
ship between punitive and actual damages would pass constitutional
muster. I do not believe that this standard, alone, is sufficient."23
Fraud and bad faith cases occupy another "common area of
personal injury damages litigation" in the cases decided after
BMW.239 In South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
v Love Chevrolet, Inc.,24° the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court's decision to reduce the jury's punitive
damage award by one half.241 In Love, an insurer brought an
action for fraud against a repair shop for failure to perform repairs
paid for by the insurance company.242 The South Carolina
Supreme Court deferred to the findings of the trial court stating that
"[i]t is fundamental that a trial judge's ruling on these motions is
discretionary and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion., 24 3 The trial court found that Love Chevrolet's
behavior was an isolated incident in which Love was not cognizant
of any wrongdoing. 244 This finding apparently was enough for the
supreme court to affirm the judgment where in a footnote it cited
to the BMW decision, stating that "the single most important
indicium of reasonableness of a punitive damage award is the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. 245
A last example of a state court case that does not apply BMW
guideposts but applies factors set out by state precedent to review
the excessiveness of a punitive damages award is Coffey v Fayette
237 Id. at 848 n.4.
238 Id. at 855 (Price, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239 Mckee, supra note 85, at 206.
240 478 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1996).
241 Id. at 58.
242 id.
243 Id. at 59.
244 Id. at 58.
245 Id. at 58 n.3.
619
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Tubular Products.2 46 In Coffey, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reinstated the trial court's remitted judgment of $50,000.00 in
compensatory and $500,000.00 in punitive damages 24 7 after
applying Tennessee's test to assess punitive damage awards.248
The only BMW guidepost applied by the Coffey court was the
nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing.249
Thus, while state courts are not applying BMW guideposts as
consistently as their federal counterparts, BMW' principles are
246 929 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1996). In Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Products, the
plaintiff sued her employer alleging that it had discharged her in retaliation for
making a worker's compensation claim. Id. at 327.
247 Id. The jury awarded $1.5 million in punitive damages and $30,000.00
in compensatory damages. Id. The trial court added $20,000.00 to the compen-
satory figure for front pay and reduced the punitive damages to $500,000.00, and
the court of appeals reduced it further to $150,000.00. Id. at 327-28.
248 Id. (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992)).
Hodges sets out a list of factors to guide the discretion of the factfinder in
assessing the amount of punitive damages:
(1) the defendant's financial affairs, financial condition and net
worth;
(2) the nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing
(3) the defendant's awareness of the amount of harm being
caused and defendant's motivation in causing the harm;
(4) the duration of defendant's misconduct and whether defen-
dant attempted to conceal the conduct;
(5) the expense plaintiff has borne in the attempt to recover the
losses;
(6) whether defendant profited from the activity, and if defen-
dant did profit, whether the punitive award should be in
excess of the profit in order to deter similar future behavior;
(7) whether, and the extent to which, defendant has been
subjected to previous punitive damage awards based upon the
same wrongful act;
(8) whether, once the misconduct became known to the defen-
dant, defendant took remedial action or attempted to make
amends by offering a prompt and fair settlement for actual
harm caused;
(9) any other circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on
determining the proper amount of the punitive award.
Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901-02 (Tenn. 1992).
249 Coffey, 929 S.W.2d at 329.
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imbedded in state precedent. The fact that punitive damages are not
substantially reduced in personal injury cases, as they are in fraud
and bad faith cases, provides a middle ground for tort reform and
consumer activism. Higher punitive damage awards may be
imposed for conduct society regards as egregious and difficult to
deter.
IV ISSUES LEFT OPEN
A. Is There a Need for Punitive Damages Reform?
The overall issue in the punitive damages debate is how to
effectively strike a balance between fair notice and state
sovereignty.2 '0  Further, "principles of state sovereignty and
comity ... forbid a State from enacting policies for the entire
Nation or imposing its own policy choice on neighboring
states.251 States should have a voice about the kind of conduct
they want to protect their citizens against and the kind of conduct
they are willing to be tolerable of to further a legitimate state
interest.212 Behind this backdrop, however, is the purpose punitive
250 "Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that
will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose." State v. Miller, 476 S.E.2d 535, 546 (W. Va. 1996) (citing BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996)). See Leading Cases,
supra note 157, at 153-54 (opining that "the Court in BMW failed to outline the
limits of [U.S.] Supreme Court intervention in an area of law traditionally
controlled by state courts and legislatures").
25 Ex parte Masonite Corp., 681 So. 2d 1068, 1078 n.5 (Ala. 1996)
(Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252 See Razook, supra note 162, at 568, 571. Razook argues that "the
creation and enforcement of product liability rules is among the long term costs
and benefits associated with the adoption of a national product liability bill
arising from the usurpation of a traditional state function." See Razook, supra
note 162, at 568. Federal reform opponents worry that if Congress nationalizes
product liability, other traditionally state areas may be regulated, for example,
worker's compensation and other areas of tort law. See Razook, supra note 162,
at 568.
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damages were designed to serve. 2" An absolute prediction of the
amount of punitive damages undercuts its purpose to deter and
punish reprehensible conduct. In the end, a check on the reason-
ableness of jury determinations and trial court decisions, without
federal caps, strikes the balance between the individual's right to
notice and the state's right to make its own policy decisions. Thus,
while it is argued that there will not be any "tort reform" by federal
and state legislatures as a result of BMW and determining the
amount of punitive damages remains a subjective ad hoc pro-
cess, 2 54 punitive damage award determinations should remain with
state courts applying BMW guideposts. Application of BMW
guideposts provides a middle ground between fair notice and state
sovereignty and between tort reform and consumer activism, while
preserving the purpose punitive damages are intended to serve: to
prevent and deter future misconduct.255
B. Should Wealth Be a Factor?
While the Court in BMW did not list the defendant's financial
condition as one of the guideposts, U.S. Supreme Court cases
decided prior to BMW and U.S. Federal District Court and state
cases decided after BMW, suggest that wealth is a factor to
consider. 6 Justice Breyer, concurring in BMW, explained: "Since
253 "Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's
legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996); see Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 206, at 1318 (noting that punitive damages serve a social
function of punishing and deterring future misconduct).
254 Mckee, supra note 85, at 216 (arguing that BMW does not provide any
answers in the "punitive damages" debate).
215 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 206, at 1277 (arguing high ratios
between punitive and compensatory damages serve to punish and deter powerful
corporations). BMW provides a middle ground by requiring judges to check the
reasonableness of punitive awards using factors applied by state courts in the past
and by deferring to state legislative determinations which provide the penalty for
unlawful conduct. See supra Part III (reviewing courts' application of BMW's
guideposts).
256 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464
(1993) ("We note ... that in Haslip we referred to the 'financial position' of the
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a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person more than a wealthy
one, one can understand the relevance of this factor to the state's
interest in retribution. 2 57 Justice Breyer continued by stating that:
[This factor] provides an open-ended basis for inflating
awards when the defendant is wealthy, [however,] ... that
does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply
means that this factor cannot make up for the failure of
other factors, such as 'reprehensibility,' to constrain an
award that purports to punish a defendant's conduct. 8
C. Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce
The majority in BMW held that the $2 million punitive damages
award was grossly excessive and violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Justice Stevens stated:
The fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an
impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement to
fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on
defendant as one factor that could be taken into account in assessing punitive
damages."). See also Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F. Supp. 1341, 1348-49 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (conceding that it is unclear after BMW to what extent wealth should be
considered, however, noting that the defendant's wealth alone cannot justify an
excessive award); lannone v. Harris, 941 F. Supp. 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that because punitive damages are designed to serve a deterrent function,
the defendant's financial position must be considered financial circumstances);
Owens v. Rheem Mfg Co., No. 94-3078, 1996 WL 426553, at *3 (E.D. La. July
29, 1996) (noting that Louisiana juries are instructed to consider the defendant's
wealth when assessing punitive damage awards).
It is also argued that the majority in BMW contradicted the practice of
considering a defendant's wealth by suggesting "that a wealthier defendant merits
greater protection from excessive awards because 'its status as an active
participant in the national economy implicates the federal interest in preventing
individual states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. "Leading
Cases, supra note 157, at 152 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct.
1589, 1604 (1996)).
257 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1606-07 (Breyer, J., concurring).
258 Id. at 1607.
259 Id. at 1604. The Court curiously alluded to a violation of the Commerce
Clause in its reasoning of why states may not use punitive damages to impose
their own regulatory policies on other states. Id.
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the conduct of its business. Indeed, its status as an active
participant in the national economy implicates the federal
interest in preventing individual States from imposing
undue burdens on interstate commerce. While each State
has ample power to protect its own consumers, none may
use the punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing
its regulatory policies on the entire Nation.26°
This is perhaps the only clear message that the Court sends;
punitive damage awards must be scrutinized. First, the Court
suggests that requiring BMW to pay $2 million in punitive damages
may impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.26' Second, if
BMW was required to pay the damages, Alabama would be
regulating paint job disclosure policies for all the states because
BMW would alter its conduct where some states might not require
full disclosure in order to lure business into their areas.262
Two theories remain about why "grossly excessive" punitive
damages are unconstitutional: (1) a high award violates due process
by not providing fair notice to the wrongdoer; 263 and (2) an
award may unduly burden interstate commerce.26 While neither
theory helps determine what the magic numbers should be, BMW
wisely takes a "minimalist approach ' 265 in a traditional state area.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 1597 (holding that "state sovereignty and comity" prohibit a state
from imposing "economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of
changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other states"). Razook argues that
"political scientists and economists agree that significant cost spillover wrought
by state action can be a justification for centralizing a function in the national
government." Razook, supra note 162, at 574. However, political scientists and
economists also suggest three advantages if government functions are decentral-
ized: (1) states are more capable than the federal government at achieving goals;
(2) federalism allows states to experiment with their own ideas; and (3) states
have the ability to "mirror the natural geographic, ethnic and cultural differences
of their citizens." Razook, supra note 162, at 574-75.
263 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
264 Id.
265 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided, 11 0 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 81 (1996) (opining that the Court should take a minimalist approach with
respect to punitive damages).
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States have passed their own versions of tort and product liability
legislation.266 Further, the decision in United States v LopeZ
267
"indicates a resurgence of Tenth Amendment balancing principles
as a limit on congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause., 26' Thus, while it is within the U.S. Supreme Court's
power to hold unconstitutional a $2 million punitive damage award
for failure to disclose that a car was repainted, the Court is
exceeding its power to regulate state tort law by setting punitive
damage limits.
D. Is Inconsistency a Desired Goal?
In Yates v BMW of North America, Inc. ,269 the jury awarded
a similar amount of compensatory damages as in BMW, yet
awarded zero punitive damages. This, perhaps, creates an argument
why there should be legislative limits on punitive damages because
consistency is a danger in all jury trials. Another argument about
why there should be constraints on juries is that before Dr. Gore
filed the suit, BMW's nondisclosure policy had never been
adjudged unlawful °.2 7 Thus, BMW had no reason to know that its
nondisclosure policy was unlawful and, therefore, was not put on
266 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 521 (stating that "the states have been
continuously successful in passing their own forms of tort and product liability
reform legislation"). Rogers argues that House Bill 956, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995), the only bill which passed both the House of Representatives
and Senate (S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)), preempts state law by setting
uniform federal standards for product liability suits, eliminates joint liability in
all product liability cases and caps punitive damage awards. Rogers, supra note
2, at 414-15.
267 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
268 Rogers, supra note 2, at 537, 539 (noting that passage of House Bill 956
depends on "the specificity and reliability of any 'findings' on the national scope
of product liability law on interstate commerce"). Rogers argues that the Court's
limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, suggests
that preemption of state tort and federal product liability reform is unconstitu-
tional. Rogers, supra note 2, at 534, 540. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1625; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
269 642 So. 2d. 937 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), cert. quashed, 642 So. 2d (Ala.
1993).
270 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (1996).
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notice that it would be required to pay as much as $2 million
where the maximum civil penalty authorized by the Alabama
legislature for a violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is
$2000.00.21 The only justification for this inconsistency was
offered by Justice Houston in his concurring opinion in BMW, in
which he stated: "I can say only that a punitive damages award lies
within the discretion of the jury., 27 2 Perhaps this inconsistency
signals to both reformers and proponents of punitive damages that
the real issue is how much discretion a jury should have and
whether BMW has contributed to answering this question. As the
analysis of each guidepost demonstrates, 273 this decision is best
left to state reviewing courts and state legislatures.
CONCLUSION
While the BMW decision has been criticized as setting no bright
lines for determining constitutionally excessive punitive damage
awards, the decision leaves the ultimate determination in the right
hands-the states. An examination of cases applying BMW
illustrates that the case is an advisory opinion of how courts should
evaluate punitive damage awards. While the Court believes that
there should be limits on jury discretion, proportionality
requirements and legislative enactments are left to state reviewing
courts and state legislatures to determine. Furthermore, BMW
provides a middle ground for tort reform and consumer activism by
requiring courts to scrutinize jury determinations without applying
a uniform federal limit.
271 Id. at 1603.
272 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d. 619, 630 (1994) (Houston,
J., concurring), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996). See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that there is inconsistency of jury results
because: (1) the jury decides a single case, and does not function as a more
permanent body; and (2) the general nature of jury instructions creates a lack of
predictability).
273 See supra Part III (discussing BMW's guideposts and reviewing
application of the guideposts by federal and state courts).
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